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BARGAINING SECTORAL STANDARDS:
TOWARDS CANADIAN FAIR PAY AGREEMENT LEGISLATION
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BARGAINING SECTORAL STANDARDS:
TOWARDS CANADIAN FAIR PAY AGREEMENT (FPA) LEGISLATION
Summary
Guiding Principles of Accountability, Integration, and Inclusivity
•

Sector standards bargained by a democratically accountable bargaining agent for workers and a
representative employer organization.

•

Co-exists with existing collective bargaining regimes and serves as a floor for collective bargaining
under existing regimes.

•

Applies to all workers in an employment relationship – including dependent contractors and gig and
platform workers.

How is this New System to be Structured?
•

New, stand-alone statute, drawing upon existing institutions administering collective bargaining
legislation (e.g., labour boards, ministries of labour)

•

Incorporating some familiar collective bargaining concepts: good faith bargaining, dues check-off,
and unfair labour practice protection.

•

Explicit exclusion from application of the Competition Act.

Who Does it Apply to?
•

Broad application to workers, operationalized by the “ABC test”, subject to managerial exclusions.

•

Preserves existing collective bargaining arrangements by excluding specified sectors with existing
high union density or existing sectoral bargaining (e.g., construction sector, public service, and
public sector where union density exceeds 70%).

How Does it Operate?
Step 1: Application to Initiate Sectoral Bargaining
•

A union applies to represent a specified sector (a defined industry or occupation within a geographic
area).

•

Applicant demonstrates support of either 500 employees or 10 percent of the proposed unit,
whichever is less, to initiate bargaining of a sectoral agreement, through signed membership cards,
including electronic cards.

•

An alternative, “Public Interest” test for representation would be available requiring demonstration
of low pay, poor working conditions, precarity or low bargaining power in the proposed sector.

Step 2: Bargaining the FPA Sector Agreement
•

Bargaining occurs between a union council and an employer council, with the labour relations board
having authority to determine council composition and resolve disputes.

•

Union councils would be composed of the union(s) with FPA certification and any union that has
bargaining rights in the sector under existing collective bargaining legislation, whether at the time
the sector certification was issued or later.
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•

Employer council would generally consist of all or some representative employers in the sector.

•

Ratification required by employees and by employers, with potential for weighted vote for smaller
employers.

•

Government supports for bargaining, including: research support to bargaining parties,
communication resources, mediation services, including intensive mediation for bargaining a first
sector agreement.

What Does a FPA Sector Agreement Include?
•

Certain matters will be “mandatory to agree” while others will be “mandatory to discuss” in
bargaining, although parties may include any other matter in bargaining that is lawful and is
employment related.

•

Bargaining parties may agree to:
•

•

Minimum entitlement provisions applying differently to an employee or class of employees
based on skill or qualifications, provided these do not violate human rights or minimum
standards laws.

Initial mandatory three-year term, with renewal term between three and five years.

How are Sector Bargaining Disputes Resolved?
•

Third-party interest arbitration with the assistance of third-party mediation would be available to
resolve sector bargaining disputes.

•

Work stoppages would not be permitted once interest arbitration is engaged.

Union Membership & Dues
•
•

•

Employees choosing to join the union pay member fees, and an employee may join at any time.
Where an FPA sector agreement is reached, membership dues are included in a negotiated wage
increase in the form of a “union member payment.” Like the dues check-off right under existing
collective bargaining legislation, this provision would be included in a sector agreement if requested
by the union.
Only union members have a right to representation by the union in respect to any violations of the
FPA sector agreement, in addition to all other rights and obligations that come with union
membership. Non-members may, individually, seek to enforce their rights under a sector
agreement, but the union has no obligation to represent non-union members in enforcing sector
agreements.

FPA Sector Agreements, Existing Collective Agreements & Future Certifications
•
•
•

Existing certifications and collective agreements are not a bar to negotiation of an FPA sector
agreement, and vice versa.
Where an employee is covered by both an FPA sector agreement and a collective agreement under
existing collective bargaining legislation, then, where there is an overlap in provisions, the employee
receives the benefit of the more favourable provision.
Therefore, the FPA sector agreement operates as a sector-wide standard floor from which unions
certified under existing legislation may collectively bargain.
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Introduction
Over the last 30 years, it has become increasingly clear that Canada’s current model for
establishing labour standards and collective bargaining, which developed during and
immediately after the Second World War, has not sufficiently adapted to our present
labour market. Increasingly, Canadian workers, particularly in the private sector, lack
access to collective representation, or to any meaningful participation in deciding the
conditions under which they work.
Declining incidence of collective bargaining in the private sector is not a new problem in
Canada. Union density has been falling since the early 1980s as the result of a variety of
factors, including globalization of production, fracturing of the workplace through
contracting out, and changing organization of work such as the growth of gig work. 2
In recognition of these long-term trends there have been numerous proposals in several
Canadian jurisdictions, since at least the early 1990s, aimed at introducing some form of
broader-based, sectoral bargaining into the existing system of Canadian labour relations. 3
Most recently, the two-year labour and employment legislation reform process in Ontario
known as the Changing Workplaces Review considered several different sectoral
bargaining proposals. 4
Compelling evidence exists that centralized bargaining structures offer significant benefits
to workers, including higher levels of collective agreement coverage, greater worker
voice, better labour standards and labour market integration for vulnerable workers,
improved productivity, reduced unemployment, higher employment, and reduced income
inequality. 5
At the same time, we have seen the growth of non-standard employment arrangements,
leaving growing numbers of workers in increasingly precarious employment relationships
that are often excluded entirely from minimum standards and collective bargaining
regimes. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has brought home to the public the importance
of the work these precarious and underrepresented workers do and the substandard
conditions under which they often work. Declining union density and growing precarity

See: Gregor Murray, “Union Renewal: What Can We Learn from Three Decades of Research?” (2017)
23:1 Transfer 9; Pradeep Kumar & Christopher Schenk, “Union Renewal and Organizational Change: A
Review of the Literature” in Pradeep Kumar & Christopher Schenk, eds, Paths to Union Renewal:
Canadian Experiences (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2006) 29; John Godard, “Do Labour Laws Matter?
The Decline and Convergence Thesis Revisited” (2003) 43:3 Industrial Relations 458.
3 For a review of sectoral bargaining proposals in Canada over the last three decades, see: Sara J Slinn,
“Broader-Based & Sectoral Bargaining in Collective Bargaining Law Reform: A Historical Review” (2020)
85 Labour / Le Travail 13 [Slinn, “Bargaining Historical Review”].
4 Ontario, Ontario Ministry of Labour, The Changing Workplaces Review: An Agenda for Workplace
Rights, by C Michael Mitchell & John C Murray, Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 23 May
2017) [Mitchell & Murray, “CWR Final Report”].
5Jelle Visser, Susan Hayter & Rosina Gammarano “Trends in Collective Bargaining Coverage: Stability,
Erosion or Decline?” (2017) INWORK Issue Brief No 1 (UN, International Labour Organisation) [UN,
“Issue Brief”; OECD, OECD Employment Outlook 2018, (OECD Publishing: Paris, 2018), Ch 3 [OECD,
“Employment Outlook”]); Matthew Dimick, “Productive Unionism” (2014) 4:2 UC Irvine L Rev 679 at681702 [Dimick, “Productive Unionism”].
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have led to increasing activism aimed at improving and broadening minimum standards
legislation.
Recently, increasing attention is being paid to a new model for bargaining minimum
sectoral standards: the New Zealand fair pay agreements legislative initiative. After a
lengthy consultation process which began in 2018, the New Zealand Fair Pay
Agreements Bill (the “Bill”) was introduced on March 29, 2022. 6
The form of sectoral bargaining set out in this Bill, based on “fair pay agreements”
(“FPAs”), is attractive because it combines enhanced access to collective bargaining with
the concept of implementing broad sectoral standards for workers across the economy
through collective bargaining. In essence, an FPA is a sector-wide collective agreement
negotiated by an employers’ association and a union council. This is not a new concept
internationally, as countries such as Australia, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Sweden,
and Belgium already have some form of industry-wide minimum standards.
Moreover, in Canada, sectoral labour relations already exist. There is de facto sectoral
bargaining in the health and education sectors in many provinces and statutory sectoral
bargaining in these sectors or across the public sector in other provinces. Similarly,
sectoral bargaining legislation is common in the construction sector. A limited example of
bargained sectoral standards in the private sector, outside of the construction industry,
can be found in the Quebec decree system, which applies to a small number of sectors
in the Quebec economy. 7 In addition, until its repeal in the early 2000s, the Ontario
Industrial Standards Act provided for tripartite negotiation of sectoral minimum
standards. 8
The history and scope of sectoral bargaining and other sector-based systems in Canada
are worth reviewing and considering in connection with implementing new proposals.
These systems have themselves been evaluated, and they may hold useful suggestions
for their improvement or adaptation to other sectors. 9 Future research could consider the
Canadian historical experience with sectoral workplace regulation, including important
features such as collectively governed systems for training and skills development, and
systems for the collective provision of pension and health and welfare benefits at low cost
and with broad coverage of the labour force – both acute problems in current labour
markets today. However, the scope of this paper is limited to describing how the FPA
model set out in the New Zealand Bill could be adapted and implemented in Canada.
This paper considers the recently introduced New Zealand Bill and offers a preliminary
series of ideas and proposals setting out how an FPA model for bargaining sectoral
standards could work in Canada. It is intended as the beginning of a more detailed

Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), 2022/115-1 (first reading on 5 April 2022). At the time of writing the Bill is
at the Select Committee which is due to report in October 2022.
7 Act respecting collective agreement decrees, CQLR c D-2.
8 Industrial Standards Act, RSO 1990, c I.6.
9 For example, see Slinn “Bargaining Historical Review,” supra note 3; Ontario, Changing Workplaces
Review, Collective Bargaining, by Sara Slinn (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, Changing Workplaces
Review, 2015), online: <https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/reports/178/>, and Ontario, Report of
Committee of Inquiry into the Industrial Standards Act (Toronto, 1963) [Ontario, “Laskin Report”].
6
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discussion on the development of an FPA regime, culminating, we hope, in model
legislation that could be adapted to different Canadian jurisdictions.
In developing this proposal, we are guided by the following basic principles of
accountability, integration, and inclusivity:
a. Standards must be bargained by a democratically accountable bargaining agent
on behalf of workers in a sector, and by a representative organization of employers
on behalf of all employers in the sector.
b. This new regime should not interfere with existing collective bargaining regimes; it
should serve as a floor from which traditionally certified unions can bargain a full
collective agreement and potentially superior collective agreement terms.
c. This new regime should apply to all workers in an employment relationship –
including dependent contractors and gig and platform workers, however defined.
We believe these are appropriate guiding principles for developing a sectoral bargaining
system. We provide a brief rationale for the selection of these principles.
The principle of democratically accountable organizations of workers and organizations
or councils of representative employers is one that is already widely recognized in
Canada labour markets and regulation. It is also consistent with constitutional foundations
and the purpose of labour market regulation in Canadian social democracy.
The principle of integration with existing labour relations regulation has both empirical and
practical rationales. Empirically, there is evidence that the combination of a sectoral “floor”
of standards, subject to individual bargaining with an employer, results in better labour
market and productivity outcomes for both workers and employers. 10 The practical
rationale is that integration will greatly facilitate the implementation of a sectoral system,
particularly where there already exists de facto sectoral bargaining within the current
system, as noted above, or where some employers in a sector already collectively
bargain. We also note that at least one Canadian system already contains a similar form
of integrated legislation – the federal Status of the Artist Act. 11 This new regime is
intended to promote negotiated sector-wide standards to allow for taking key employment
terms and conditions out of competition across various sectors of the economy.
The principle of inclusiveness incorporates both inclusiveness in the sense of including
all workplaces and all workers within a sector, with the goal of reorienting the terms of
competition within a labour or product market away from key terms and conditions of
work. This principle responds to one of the labour market conditions that gives rise to the
need for a sectoral solution: the continuing trend towards fragmentation or “fissuring” of
the workplace and the organization of work, the growing incidence of employee
misclassification, and new work arrangements such as “gig work”. An FPA is intended to
cover all persons performing paid work in an employment or employment-like working
10 See UN, “Issue Brief” and OECD, “Employment Outlook”, supra note 5; see also: Dimick, “Productive
Unionism”, supra note 5; Matthew Dimick, “Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System” (2012)
90:2 NCL Rev 319.
11
Status of the Artist Act, SC 1992, c 33. This federal Act operates in parallel with the Canada Labour
Code (RSC 1985, c L-2) collective bargaining and minimum standards regimes.
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relationship. 12 Indeed, in some sectors, sectorally negotiated norms were developed to
address exactly these conditions. 13
Our proposal is consistent with a form of “organized decentralization” that the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) recognizes as
achieving a desirable balance between collective bargaining coverage and flexibility and,
therefore, avoids or minimizes potential negative effects on productivity while not reducing
the number of workers represented. 14 This proposal incorporates flexibility by establishing
sectoral agreements as minimum standards that permit individual enterprises to establish
their own wage and working condition agreements, provided that the minimum standard
is respected. The OECD identifies this “favourability principle” as a means of providing
flexibility at the sub-sector level. 15
As detailed below, what we propose is a system providing for sectoral bargaining of a
suite of sector-wide minimum workplace standards, which will operate in parallel with
existing collective bargaining and minimum standards legislation, and which will support
and complement – not compete with – existing and future collective bargaining rights.
The Canadian FPA Model
The following section outlines the main contours of our proposal for a sectoral bargaining
model incorporating key features of the New Zealand Bill, modified to fit into the Canadian
labour relations and legal landscape, and which respects the guiding principles set out
above. This Canadian FPA model could then be further adapted to suit particular
Canadian jurisdictions.
1. Structure of the Legislation
Like the New Zealand Bill, we propose that a new Canadian FPA regime should start with
a new statute – not amendments to existing labour statutes such as minimum standards
or labour relations legislation. However, the new statute would likely require
“housekeeping” amendments to existing workplace legislation to ensure that the new
sectoral bargaining regime works seamlessly with, and does not undermine, our current
collective bargaining or minimum standards systems. Again, in keeping with the principle
of integration, the intent behind the FPA is not to displace existing workplace law or labour
Several proposals exist for how to expand the definition of “employee” to ensure that gig workers and
other misclassified workers are included. One widely discussed option is employing a new “ABC” test for
“employee,” which has been proposed in the U.S. and Canada. See, for example: Mandryk et al., “ABCs
of Gig Work” (4 May 2021), online (blog): Unsolicited: The Blog <https://goldblattpartners.com/unsolicitedblog/the-abcs-of-gig-work/>
13 Marcus Klee, “Fighting the Sweatshop in Depression Ontario: Capital, Labour and the Industrial
Standards Act” (2000) 45 Labour/Le Travailleur 13.
14 The OECD identifies three elements characterizing “organized decentralization”: a reasonable
representativeness criterion; a meaningful test of public interest; and, well-defined procedures for
exemptions and opt-outs (OECD, “Employment Outlook,” supra note 5 at Chapter 3). Each of these is
incorporated into our proposal.
15 OECD, “Employment Outlook,” supra note 5 at Chapter 3.
12

5

relations, but to extend a system for collective bargaining to sectors that, for a variety of
reasons, are unable to access collective bargaining under existing laws.
We also propose that this new regime utilizes existing institutions that presently
administer labour relations statutes. For example, we propose that applications to initiate
the negotiation of an FPA be filed with existing labour boards. We also propose that labour
boards have jurisdiction to determine the appropriate unit that would be covered by the
FPA, as well as any initial or ongoing disputes about inclusions or exclusions from the
unit. The labour board would also have jurisdiction to restructure or consolidate sectoral
units.
As set out in more detail below, our proposal also involves the active involvement of
government labour ministries to oversee and resource negotiation of the FPAs and their
conclusion. We also envisage that a tribunal (either the labour board or a division thereof)
would be needed to resolve disputes connected to the bargaining process (for example,
we propose a good faith bargaining requirement) and the ultimate process by which the
sectoral agreement is concluded, which, as set out below, would involve mandatory
interest arbitration.
2. Application to Categories of Workers
The New Zealand Bill defines “employee” as having the same meaning as that found in
New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act 2000. 16 That definition includes anyone
“employed by an employer to do any work for hire or reward under a contract of service.”
The definition also notes that the relevant authority must “determine the real nature of the
relationship” between employer and employee. As such, the definition likely includes
dependent contractors.
The New Zealand Bill also includes a specific provision that is designed to address
misclassification. 17 Section 21 states that an employer must not engage a person as an
independent contractor if the real nature of the relationship is an employment relationship.
The section contains a specific penalty if an employer is found to misclassify an employee
to avoid coverage by an FPA. 18
Our proposed Canadian FPA regime would also be of broad application. As noted above,
one of our guiding principles is that this new regime should apply to all workers in an
employment relationship, including dependent contractors as well as gig and platform
workers who are dependent contractors. In our proposal, we would use the term
“employee” to refer to all of these eligible categories of workers.
16

6.

Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, s 5(1); Employment Relations Act 2000 (NZ), 2000/24, s

Ibid, s 21.
A New Zealand Cabinet document recommendation which preceded this Bill proposed that the Fair
Play Agreements legislation apply initially to employees only, with contractors to be incorporated into the
regime at some point in the future. See: NZ, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Cabinet
Paper: Fair Pay Agreements: Approval to Draft (7 May 2021), online (pdf): Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment <https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/14297-fair-pay-agreementsapproval-to-draft-proactiverelease-pdf>.
17
18
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To operationalize this, we propose to apply what is known as the “ABC test,” which has
been adopted for determining employment status in many jurisdictions across the United
States. It provides that a worker is an employee unless the hiring entity can establish that:
A) the worker is free from its control, both factually and under the terms of the
contract for performing the work;
B) the worker performs work outside the usual course of its business; and
C) the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed.
The ABC test also typically contains a business-to-business exemption recognizing that
bona fide business relationships are not employment relationships. We also propose
including this exemption.
This inclusive approach, including incorporation of the ABC test, may reduce unnecessary
disputes over misclassification and reduce incentives for employers to fissure work and
workplaces.
3. Applying for Sectoral Bargaining
Under our proposal, the first step towards the achievement of a sectoral agreement would
be an application to initiate the bargaining process for a specified sector. The process for
applying for sectoral bargaining under this system is different, and less onerous, than the
mandatory vote or card-based certification requirement in typical Canadian labour
relations systems. It requires that a sector be defined and satisfying a threshold
representation test by demonstrating a specified, minimum, amount of employee support
in the sector.
a) Defining the Sector
Like the New Zealand Bill, we propose that, under a Canadian FPA regime, each
application must define the covered workforce by industry or occupation. 19 Under an
industry application, the initiating union would be required to describe the industry and
each occupation in the industry that the agreement proposes to cover. Under an
occupational application, the initiating union would be required to describe the occupation,
including a description of the work to which the agreement would apply.
Under the New Zealand Bill, an occupation-based agreement must apply to all employees
in the occupation, while an industry-based agreement must apply to all employees in the
industry. There is no room for exclusions. The coverage of the proposed FPA must be
specific, with sufficient clarity that all employees and employers are able to determine
whether they are covered by the FPA. 20 In line with the principle of inclusivity, and
consistent with a sectoral approach, we also propose that no exclusions be available from
sectors, although we propose incorporating a managerial exclusion requirement
19
20

Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, s 31.
Ibid.
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operating in the same manner as managerial exclusions in existing Canadian collective
bargaining legislation. Therefore, worker exclusions would be limited to managerial
exclusions.
However, unlike the proposed New Zealand Bill, 21 which provides only for nation-wide
FPA bargaining units, we propose that sector descriptions in applications would also
include a geographic dimension which reflects the particular industry or occupation. We
propose that there be a preference for sectors with larger geographic scope, which could
include provincial, regional, municipal or even a smaller scope if it could be justified within
a sectoral bargaining framework. geographic areas, depending on the circumstances. 22
The key considerations for the authority considering the application would be the whether
the proposed unit is one that would be reasonably capable of bargaining on a sectoral
basis.
Nonetheless, we do not believe that every sector of the economy should be covered by
this legislation. Therefore, we propose limited sector exclusions. Specifically, we propose
that, in keeping with the principle of integration, certain Canadian sectors that already
have high union density or some form of sectoral bargaining should be excluded from this
new regime. We propose that the public service and much of the public sector – where
union density exceeds 70 percent, and where sectoral bargaining may already be
statutorily provided – should not be covered by the proposed FPA legislation. We would
also propose that the construction sector – which is relatively highly unionized and already
benefits from sectoral bargaining – also be excluded. The purpose of these exclusions is
not to disadvantage these groups of workers, but rather to ensure that new sectoral
bargaining regime does not in any way undermine the collective agreements and
collective bargaining arrangements that already exist in highly unionized sectors.

21 There is no geographic scope provision in the New Zealand legislation – an FPA applies to the entire
country.
22 As most collective bargaining in Canada falls under provincial rather than federal jurisdiction, in most
cases the largest possible geographic scope for a sector would be province-wide. This would not rule out
a nation-wide sector in an appropriate case where that collective bargaining falls under federal
jurisdiction.
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b) Threshold to Trigger Bargaining Process
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the New Zealand Bill is the means by which the right
to negotiate an FPA is triggered. Under this Bill, an applicant union must satisfy a
“representation test” by demonstrating the support of at least 1,000 employees within the
proposed unit (the proposed sector) or 10 percent of the proposed unit. 23 Once the
application is received, the Ministry of Labour (in New Zealand, it is an authority
established under the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (the “Authority”),
or equivalent body, is responsible for assessing the application and the level of support,
and can provide an opportunity for submissions from affected parties, after notice is
provided. Notably, although the Bill does not specify the necessary form of evidence of
support, it does provide that employee membership in the applicant union is not sufficient
evidence of support for the purpose of the representation test. 24
Existing collective bargaining regimes in Canada typically require a majority, or a very
significant percentage, of workers in a bargaining unit to support certification of a union
to engage in statutory collectively bargaining. However, in many countries, workers can
engage in collective bargaining without demonstrating majority support, or even the
support of a substantial proportion of the workers in a workplace. In this sense,
internationally, Canada is an outlier in maintaining its insistence on majoritarian support
for collective bargaining.
We propose that the threshold representation test under the Canadian FPA model
requires a lower percentage or number of workers to trigger the collective bargaining
process, precisely because existing labour relations systems are inaccessible to workers
in sectors such as fast food or home care. The purpose of this lower threshold
representation test is the same as under the mainstream Canadian collective bargaining
system: to demonstrate that there exists material and adequate support from the
employees to trigger collective bargaining, and for the bargaining of an agreement.
Evidence of support could be in the form of signed membership cards, including electronic
membership cards.
Further, we propose that the threshold test for representation under the Canadian FPA
model be slightly lower than that provided in the New Zealand Bill: that the union must
demonstrate the support of either 500 employees or 10 percent of the proposed unit to
initiate bargaining of a sectoral agreement, whichever is less. We propose this slightly
lower threshold for two reasons. First, Canadian labour markets are spread across much
larger geographical regions than in New Zealand (and regulated primarily by provincial
laws). A lower threshold will, we believe, provide an opportunity for access to collective
bargaining while still ensuring that adequate support exists among relevant workers.
Second, an applicant union must also be an “eligible union” under the New Zealand Bill,
meaning that it has at least one existing member in the proposed unit; has a constitution
allowing the union to represent collective interests of employees in the proposed unit,
whether or not they are union members; and, that the union is registered under the New

23
24

Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, s 29.
Ibid, s 29(3).
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Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000. 25 We propose adopting the existing Canadian
collective bargaining approach to definition of a trade union.
The New Zealand Bill also includes an alternative “public interest test,” which would allow
the initiation of bargaining without the mandated employee support. 26 As part of the
assessment for the “public interest test” under this Bill, the Authority must be satisfied that
the workers in the industry or occupation experience low pay, low bargaining power, a
lack of pay progression, and/or long hours including contractual uncertainty that is not
adequately compensated. 27
We also propose including in the Canadian FPA model a public interest test for FPA
representation applications that do not have the required employee support. Similar to
the New Zealand Bill, such a test would also require that low pay, poor working conditions,
and/or precarity or low bargaining power be present in the sector.
4. Bargaining the FPA: Procedure
a) Bargaining Agents and Participation in Bargaining
Under the New Zealand Bill, once the FPA application has been approved, both the
employee and the employer sides have three months to organize themselves before the
initiation of bargaining. 28 The legislation contemplates that any union can apply to be part
of the employee side, provided that the union represents at least one member who will
be covered by the proposed FPA. For a union to become part of the employee side
bargaining group, its application must be approved by the Ministry of Business, Innovation
and Employment. 29 On the employer side, an employer association must form in order to
bargain, and an employer can apply to be part of the association, or an employer can be
deemed to be part of the employer if the employer has employees covered by the FPA. 30
Hence, FPAs under the New Zealand Bill would effectively be bargained by union councils
and employer councils.
For the Canadian FPA model, we propose that FPA bargaining would also take place
between a union council and an employer council. Generally, the union council would be
composed of the union or unions certified under the FPA regime and any union that has
bargaining rights in the sector under the relevant, existing collective bargaining legislation,
whether at the time the sector certification was issued or later. An employer council would
generally consist of all or some representative employers in the sector. We anticipate that
both union councils and employer councils will seek to determine among themselves the
rights of membership and participation in the council, and which unions and employers
will act as representatives for the purpose of bargaining procedures, among other things.
One option to consider is whether weighted voting would be appropriate to apply within
Ibid, s 5(1).
Ibid, ss 28, 29(4).
27 Ibid, s 29(4).
28 Ibid, ss 35, 45.
29 Ibid, ss 49-52.
30 Ibid, ss 42-46.
25
26
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councils, such that different council members may have votes with greater or lesser
weight.
Government resources and support are likely to play a key role in assisting union and
employer councils to form and prepare themselves for bargaining, particularly in the initial
stages of implementing the FPA framework. The labour relations board would have the
authority to determine the composition of each council and to resolve any disputes about
composition or constitutional arrangements.
b) Communication with Employees and Notice of Bargaining
The New Zealand model incorporates substantial notice and communication
requirements, largely based on the notice and communication rights found in the New
Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000, including significant opportunities for unions to
meet with and communicate with workers. These apply when FPA bargaining is initiated
and when the applicant union has satisfied one of the representation tests.
Under the New Zealand model, the initiating union or unions must notify affected
employers and unions when an FPA is initiated. 31 Meanwhile, the Ministry is required to
publish a notice of initiation of bargaining as soon as it is reasonably practicable to do
so. 32 Further, all employers whose employees are covered by the proposed FPA must
notify all affected employees of the initiation of bargaining. 33
Then, any employer that has been notified of the successful initiation of an FPA must
provide contact information for all covered employees to the bargaining representative,
except where the employee objects. 34
The New Zealand Bill provides that all employees covered by the FPA may attend up to
two paid meetings of up to two hours each, in their workplace, relating to the proposed
FPA. 35 Employees may attend a third meeting if the proposed FPA has been voted on
and not ratified by the employees.
Further, under the New Zealand Bill, a representative of the employee bargaining agent
is entitled to access workplaces to meet with one of more employees to discuss
bargaining or other matters related to the FPA. These meetings are over and above the
two full workplace meetings set out in the Bill. 36
We believe that similar communication, notification, and workplace access provisions
would work in Canada. One of the significant barriers for unions and groups of employees
in seeking collective bargaining rights in sectors that are hard to organize – like fast food
or home care – is timely access to worker contact information and the opportunity to
actually contact them. This is exacerbated where labour forces have high turnover rates
or are geographically decentralized.
Ibid, s 36.
Ibid, s 34.
33 Ibid, s 37.
34 Ibid, s 39.
35 Ibid, ss 81-84.
36 Ibid, ss 86-91.
31
32
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Accordingly, we propose that the Ministry of Labour, or an equivalent body, would be
responsible for giving notice of the representation decision and communicating with
sector employees. Communications will include notification of the certification and
negotiation processes. A combination of forms and notices are to be utilized, including
public notices, notices posted in the workplace and through workplace communication
channels, and notice to individual employees.
We propose that, post-certification, employers would be required to provide contact
information for employees in the sector for the purpose of allowing the representative
union to consult with employees about bargaining. We also propose that the employee
bargaining agent should have the right to meet with employees covered by the FPA, and
that employees should have the right to at least two paid meetings with the employee
bargaining council in each affected workplace to discuss the FPA.
The communication and workplace consultation rights found in the New Zealand Bill far
exceed similar rights found in any Canadian labour relations legislation. Therefore, the
question arises as to whether it is feasible to require employers to provide rights to their
employees, and to the FPA bargaining agent, that are far more substantial than the rights
they are required to provide in the context of a regular unionization campaign and
collective bargaining under existing Canadian collective bargaining legislation. We think
the rights set out in the New Zealand Bill are sensible and practical, particularly since the
scope of the FPA will necessarily involve many workers who were not involved in the
organizing campaign. However, realistically, such rights could only be implemented in
Canada, in our view, if similar provisions were also added to the existing collective
bargaining legislation in the same jurisdiction. Communication and consultation rights and
restrictions in the labour context have long been contentious in Canada. This suggests
that Canadian legislatures would not likely implement similar provisions as are found in
the New Zealand Bill.
c) Bargaining Resources and Supports
Under the New Zealand Bill, both the employee and the employer side are eligible for
mediation services and bargaining support services from the government. 37
As noted briefly above, our proposal would also emphasize an array of government
supports for bargaining that would be available from the earliest stage of negotiation. (See
section 9, below, addressing “Union Member Payments”). The purpose of these supports
is to foster constructive and viable negotiations and bargaining relationships. Supports
would include providing research support to bargaining parties, including wage data,
government assistance for bargaining parties to identify and communicate with employers
and employees in the sector, and with the potential for additional support to be provided
in appropriate circumstances.
An additional form of support would be the provision for mediation services by the Ministry
of Labour or an equivalent body to assist with bargaining and, later, for interpretation and

37

Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, ss 204-210.
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application of the agreement. In the case of first sector agreement bargaining, intensive
mediation services would be available at the request of one or both bargaining parties.
Finally, adequate support for administering and enforcing sector agreements is
necessary, whether these are drawn from the system actors, government, or a
combination. 38
d) Good Faith Bargaining
The New Zealand Bill has a very broad obligation that all parties must act in good faith.39
This, of course, includes unions and employers. Both unions and employers have an
obligation to act in good faith both towards each other, but also towards the other unions
and employers involved in the FPA process. In other words, parties must act in good faith
both towards bargaining parties on the other side, and parties on the same side. 40 As with
other violations of the Bill, the penalty for violating the broad obligation to act in good faith
is a fine of not more than $20,000 to $40,000. 41 Further, the obligation applies both during
bargaining and after the FPA is implemented.
We propose that a duty to bargain in good faith would apply to negotiations, as in the New
Zealand model. The duty of good faith is already embedded in Canadian labour relations
laws and is familiar to all stakeholders. Included in the duty should be the duty to make
reasonable efforts to reach an agreement. Although Canadian remedies for the duty to
bargain in good faith are often criticized as insufficient, we regard the presence of an
express duty as sending a message to the parties that bargaining is to be taken seriously.
One additional remedy that could be contemplated would be to provide that a breach of
the duty to bargain in good faith could lead to the expedited referral of outstanding matters
to interest arbitration. Another possible remedy would be to expand the range of issues
that can be decided by the interest arbitrator or arbitration panel in the event that bad faith
bargaining is found.

For example, a review of the Ontario Industrial Standards Act (“ISA”) found that reliance on
underfunded government inspectors significantly weakened the ISA system’s capacity for inspections and
enforcement (see Ontario, Laskin Report, supra note 9). Contrast this with the Quebec decrees system,
under which Parity Committees composed of employer and employee representatives, charged with
administering the decree, are funded through employer levies.
39 Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, ss 17-21.
40 Ibid, ss 18-19.
41 Ibid, s 20.
38
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5. Bargaining the FPA: Content
a) Mandatory to Agree and Discuss Provisions
The proposed New Zealand Bill provides that certain matters will be “mandatory to agree”
while others will be “mandatory to discuss” in bargaining, although parties may include
any other matter in bargaining provided that it is lawful and is employment related.
Section 114 of the New Zealand Bill sets out the “mandatory to agree” items, which
include the term, coverage, hours of work, wage rates (including overtime rates),
governance arrangements, and a process to amend the agreement. 42 Section 115 sets
out the topics the parties must discuss but are not obligated to agree upon. These include
health and safety provisions, leaves, flexible working arrangements, layoff language, as
well as provisions for the renewal of the agreement. 43
Further, the parties may bargain any other terms in the agreement so long as the
provisions relate to “the employment of covered employees,” and the parties may not
extend the scope of the FPA or bargain a provision that violates any New Zealand law. 44
This division of required terms to bargain and discuss is not a feature of most labour
relations legislation in Canada (while it is present in other jurisdictions, like the U.S.). Our
proposal generally adopts the New Zealand approach. It is of assistance to the collective
bargaining parties, and it is necessary to a functioning sectoral agreement, that certain
minimum terms of employment be negotiated and set in an FPA. However, the matters
that we suggest fall into each of the two bargaining categories differ somewhat from the
New Zealand Bill (see Table 1, below.) We propose that “mandatory to agree” topics
should include wages, wage rate adjustment mechanisms, pension contribution inclusion
in base wages, hours and overtime, agreement coverage, term of the agreement, and
governance arrangements. However, we also propose that benefits, holidays and
vacation, and scheduling be included in this category since they are so closely related to
other mandatory issues. Experience with sectoral systems already existing in Canada
also supports these inclusions: indeed, pension and benefit plans tend to be centralized
multi-employer or sectoral arrangements that are related to collective bargaining and
funded through bargained contributions. Moreover, access to these benefits is typically
among the top priorities for precarious workers. 45
As in the New Zealand Bill, we propose that “mandatory to discuss” topics include
redundancy, leaves, objectives of the agreement, skills and training, health and safety,
and flexible work. A key consideration here is to recognize unions’ key role in negotiation
and benefit delivery.

Ibid, s 114.
Ibid, s 115.
44 Ibid, s 116.
45 Both union and employers have recognized this. See, for example, Uber’s proposals in several
jurisdictions that one of its drivers’ key demands is access to a collective benefits program. See: Simon
Archer & Joshua Mandryk, “The Uber portable benefits pig-in-a-poke” (30 March 2022), online (blog):
Unsolicited: The Blog <https://goldblattpartners.com/unsolicited-blog/the-uber-portable-benefits-pig-in-apoke/>.
42
43
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Table 1: Mandatory to Agree and Mandatory to Discuss Topics of Bargaining
Mandatory to Agree

Mandatory to Discuss

Wages

Redundancy

Wage rate adjustment mechanism

Leaves

Whether pension contributions are included in
base wage rates

Objectives of the agreement

Ordinary hours, overtime, overtime rates

Skills and training

Scheduling

Health and safety

Benefits

Flexible work

Holidays and vacation time
Coverage
Term of agreement
Governance (e.g., ongoing responsibilities of
bargaining parties)

The New Zealand Bill provides that FPAs may only include “employment-related” terms,
presumably out of concern over possible conflict with competition legislation. 46 While we
also propose that the parties may agree to discuss any other lawful employment-related
terms, we regard limiting the scope of bargaining to employment-related matters as a
matter of practicality that will help support effective bargaining, rather than a necessary
response to concerns about potential conflict with competition regulation. Nonetheless,
we also suggest that, as has been done in the case of other collective bargaining
legislation, this legislation include an explicit exclusion from application of the Competition
Act. 47
b) Permitted Differences in the FPA
The New Zealand Bill provides latitude for bargaining parties to agree on specified
exemptions from certain FPA terms and differential terms within an agreement.
Specifically, the legislation provides that an FPA may include regional variations with
respect to terms such as wages, hours of work, overtime, and leave provisions. 48

Ibid.
See, for example, Status of the Artist Act, supra note 11; Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34. Although
existing “carve outs” from competition legislation apply to collective bargaining – including sectoral
collective bargaining – and exclude associations of employees or “workmen” as well as groups of
employers, where their activities and agreements are made in furtherance of protecting their interests as
employees, workmen, or employers, an amendment to the Competition Act expressly acknowledging
sectoral regimes may assist for greater certainty.
48 Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, ss 123-124.
46
47
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The legislation also permits a minimum entitlement provision that applies differently to an
employee or class of employees based on skill or qualifications, provided these do not
violate human rights or minimum standards laws. 49
We agree with the New Zealand Bill that an FPA should be permitted to provide for
different entitlements for different classifications of workers. We would not, however,
propose that Canadian FPAs be permitted to have regional differences. Instead, unlike
the New Zealand Bill, we would propose that FPAs could have a geographic scope such
that they apply in less than the entire jurisdiction (that is, less than an entire province or
the entire country).
We accept that, in some sectoral bargaining systems, unions may regard allowing
sectoral agreements to derogate from statutory minimum standards to be an important
bargaining tool. 50 However, we do not regard this as a constructive element in
establishing sectoral bargaining in the private sector in Canada. Therefore, as in the New
Zealand Bill, we propose that FPA terms must respect human rights and minimum
standards legislation and cannot contract out of them.
c) FPA Term and Renewal
The New Zealand Bill does not mandate a particular term for an FPA but does specify
that an FPA must apply for a period of not less than three years and not more than five
years. 51
The Bill includes extensive provisions setting out the process for varying an FPA, which
may be done at any time prior to the expiry of the FPA. 52 The New Zealand Bill also
includes a process for the renewal of an FPA, which involves filing an application to renew
the agreement within a particular timeframe before the expiry of the agreement, similar to
the process for renewing a collective agreement under existing Canadian collective
bargaining legislation. 53
While sectoral agreements that continue by default unless a specific triggering event
occurs may offer stability, including by eliminating the possibility of the loss of sector
standards where the agreement lapses, fixed-term agreements have the benefit of
producing regular renegotiation of terms without requiring a triggering even and without
re-establishing representativeness. 54
For a Canadian FPA model, we believe that certainty is necessary regarding the term of
the agreement. Much as collective agreements under Canadian law must have terms of
Ibid, ss 125-126.
Clean Slate for Worker Power, “Principles of Sectoral Bargaining: A Reference Guide for Designing
Federal, State, and Local Laws in the U.S.” (May 2021), online (pdf): Harvard Law School
<https://uploadsssl.webflow.com/5fa42ded15984eaa002a7ef2/608c62c74dc0547710cec088_Clean%20Slate_Sectoral%
20Bargaining_May%202021.pdf>.
51 Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, s 114(2)(a).
52 Ibid, ss 164-181.
53 Ibid, ss 182-195.
54 Clean Slate for Worker Power, supra note 50 at 15.
49
50
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at least one year, we would propose that an initial FPA must have a three-year term. This
will provide predictability and consistency across each sector of the economy. The shorter
initial term is also designed to foster engagement in bargaining and to allow for a degree
of experimentation in the first agreement. Bargaining would be expected to be an iterative
process. Reflecting this, we propose that renewal agreements would have maximum fiveyear terms, although the parties could agree to shorter terms, provided that it is not for a
period of less than three years.
6. Conclusion and Ratification of the FPA
Under the New Zealand Bill, once the parties have reached an agreement, they must
submit the proposed FPA to the government for a compliance assessment. 55 No FPA
may be entered unless the government Authority is satisfied that the FPA meets the
requirement of the FPA legislation and complies with minimum standards legislation and
all other employment laws. 56
Once the Authority has approved the proposed FPA, the parties then have 40 days to
ratify the agreement. 57 All employees and employers who are to be covered by the FPA
are to be contacted and provided with a copy of the agreement as well as a plain language
summary of the agreement. 58 The Bill contains detailed sections setting out the voting
information that must be provided to each employer and employee.
The FPA is considered ratified by the employees if more than half of the employees who
vote, vote in favour of the agreement. On the employer side, employer votes are weighted
in accordance with the number of employees they have who are to be covered by the
FPA. However, small employers (fewer than 21 employees) are given more weight in
terms of their vote. Employer ratification is obtained where a majority of these weighted
employer votes are in favour of ratifying the agreement. 59
We also propose that, in Canada, negotiated sector agreements would be required to be
ratified by employees and by employers. We further propose that it should be clear that
the vote can be conducted electronically and that there be government facilitated
distribution of information to affected employees and employees about the agreement in
advance of the ratification vote.
Employee ratification of agreements is an important aspect of worker participation in
collective bargaining, workplace democracy, and it contributes to the legitimacy of sector
agreements. Although sectors may include large numbers of employees, we believe that
use of electronic ratification voting will allow these large elections with potentially widely
distributed employees to be feasible. Large bargaining units existing under current
collective bargaining statutes – including those with employees dispersed among multiple
worksites – have successfully held electronic ratification votes.
Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, ss 132-139.
Ibid, s 133.
57 Ibid, s 142.
58 Ibid, s 141.
59 Ibid, s 144.
55
56
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Employer ratification of sector agreements is also important. We would leave the question
as to whether and how to provide a weighted vote to smaller employers, as has been
done in New Zealand, to the employer community. We would also grant the labour board
the power to resolve disputes among employers.
7. Dispute Resolution – Interest Arbitration of the FPA
Under the New Zealand Bill, parties may apply to the Employment Relations Authority to
fix the terms of the proposed FPA. However, they may only apply if they have exhausted
all other alternatives for reaching an agreement, the parties have used their best
endeavours to identify reasonable alternatives to agree to a proposed FPA, and/or the
proposed FPA has been put to ratification twice and has been rejected both times. 60
Under the New Zealand Bill, strikes and lockouts are expressly prohibited as dispute
resolution mechanisms for an FPA, unless the strike or lockout would otherwise be legal
– presumably in the context of regular collective bargaining for employees who might also
be covered by an FPA. 61
Under the Bill, the Authority is to appoint a three-person panel to resolve the FPA. That
panel has the power to fix any and all terms that must be in the FPA (mandatory terms).
The panel also has the power to fix “mandatory to discuss” items if one party requests
that the Authority settle the term. Finally, the Authority may settle additional terms that
are neither mandatory to include or discuss, if both parties request that the Authority do
so. 62
The New Zealand Bill sets out a range of factors that the Authority will consider in setting
the terms of the FPA. 63 However, there are certain limitations on what the Authority may
decide. In particular, the panel may not fix union member payments (to cover membership
dues in a union) unless both sides agree. 64 Once the terms of the FPA are determined
by the panel, the FPA does not need to be ratified by either side.
The process set out in the New Zealand Bill is quite similar to a number of mandatory
interest arbitration models that exist in Canada. Like the New Zealand Bill, we propose
that arbitration could only be triggered after the parties had bargained and failed to reach
an agreement, with the assistance of mediation. Arbitration, in our view, should be a last
resort, and should involve a sole arbitrator. Once interest arbitration is engaged for a
dispute, a ban on work stoppages applies.
Also, as under the New Zealand Bill, we propose that the interest arbitrator would have
to determine all outstanding mandatory items and could determine “mandatory to discuss”
items upon the request of one party. Any other matters could only be determined upon
the consent of both parties.

Ibid, s 218.
Ibid, s 25.
62 Ibid, s 219.
63 Ibid, s 220.
64 Ibid, s 221.
60
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With respect to the factors to be considered by the arbitrator, Canada has well established
jurisprudence setting out the factors that should be considered by interest arbitrators. As
such, we do not believe that a list of factors in the legislation would be necessary.
However, if the legislation did include factors, they should be based on Canadian labour
relations reality and jurisprudence and provide latitude to the arbitrator to consider such
other matters as the arbitrator considers reasonable.
8. Ongoing Representation Issues: Coverage and Consolidation
The New Zealand Bill sets out a fairly complicated approach to dealing with potential
overlap in coverage of employees between two FPAs, which aims to avoid duplication of
coverage in part by providing for consolidation of bargaining parties and FPAs. 65
a) Overlapping Coverage
Where overlap in coverage exists between an existing FPA and an FPA that is either
being proposed, a proposed renewal, or proposed replacement, in addition to providing
notice to the initiator and relevant employee and employer bargaining parties, the
Authority will review the terms of the proposed and existing FPA to determine which
provides better terms overall for the employees subject to the overlap in coverage, which
will then be the FPA which applies to those employees. 66
Similarly, in circumstances of initiation of bargaining for an industry-based FPA with
coverage that would overlap with an occupation covered by an existing industry-based
FPA, the New Zealand Bill provides that the proposed agreement will be validated not as
a stand-alone agreement, but as a schedule to the existing FPA, and it may not alter the
first agreement. 67
Our proposal prefers to avoid overlap. However, where it occurs, then our proposal
adopts the approach set out in the New Zealand Bill, on the basis that it supports collective
bargaining and prevents decline in sector standards.
b) Consolidation
The New Zealand Bill provides for consolidating bargaining of two proposed FPAs in
circumstances where they have overlapping coverage of an occupation group (this
applies to proposed FPAs, proposed renewals, or proposed replacements). 68
Consolidation is automatic if initiation of bargaining of the second FPA is granted less
than six months after the first; if the second approval was granted six or more months
after the first, then the bargaining sides for the first FPA have a limited period during which
they can opt to have the two FPAs consolidated. Where consolidation occurs, the
employee and employer bargaining parties for the two FPAs are combined. The
Ibid, ss 103-113.
Ibid, ss 103-105, 154, 155.
67 Ibid, ss 112-113.
68 Ibid, ss 106-111.
65
66
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bargaining party of the second FPA can request that the combined bargaining side
negotiate an inter-party agreement for the combined bargaining side. Coverage of the
consolidated FPA is the coverage of the first FPA extended to include that of the second,
unless all bargaining parties agree otherwise.
If a bargaining side for the first FPA does not opt for consolidation, then the second FPA
will not be validated as a stand-alone FPA, and cannot alter any terms of the first FPA,
and will operate as an amendment adding a schedule to the first, verified, FPA.
In contrast with the New Zealand approach, which appears to limit consolidation to
circumstances where overlap arises among existing or proposed FPAs, our proposed
approach would provide greater scope for consolidation and accretion of agreements and
bargaining parties. In part, this reflects established practices in Canadian collective
bargaining regimes such as the variance and consolidation provisions found in the
Canada Labour Code and the British Columbia Labour Relations Code, which give labour
boards the authority to exercise discretion in making such decisions, and which allows
the parties to seek post-recognition amendments of bargaining rights in circumstances
beyond those of potential overlapping scope of units. 69
Under our approach, the proposed model would include a mechanism to permit accretion
to and consolidation of sectoral units. In addition to determining initial coverage and
representation, the labour board would have the authority to hear and decide applications
and disputes about accretion and consolidation of sectoral bargaining units, as well as
status challenges. The labour board’s discretion and decision-making would be guided
by a determination of bargaining “appropriateness,” the broader objectives of the
legislation, and, in cases where a union sought accretion or consolidation of units, a
presumption in favour of granting the application.
9. Union Member Payment
The New Zealand Bill does not contain any provision providing for the mandatory payment
or collection of union dues from employees covered by an FPA. In fact, the legislation
makes it very clear that no employee who is covered by an FPA has any obligation to join
a union, nor can the FPA contain any provision requiring an employee to join a union. 70
Further, the New Zealand Bill makes it very clear that the terms of an FPA may not provide
any preference, whether in terms and conditions of employment or in terms of hiring, to
employees who are union members except in respect of so-called “union member
payments.” 71
Section 13(4) of the Bill provides that, where an employee is covered by an FPA and is a
union member, the parties may negotiate a regular payment from the employer to
employees, over and above their wages, that is the equivalent of employees’ union
membership fees.

Canada Labour Code, RSC, 1985, c L-2, s 18.1; Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996, c 244, s 142.
Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, s 10.
71 Ibid, s 13.
69
70
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Unions play a number of significant roles in this proposed Canadian FPA model:
organizing workers, acting as bargaining representatives, administering sector
agreements, participating in dispute resolution, and potentially pursuing enforcement of
sector agreements. Unions must be adequately resourced to be able to discharge these
responsibilities. Moreover, since implementation of the Rand Formula in Canada, it has
generally been the case that employees covered by a collective agreement are required
to pay union dues, whether or not they are members of the union.
Therefore, if the Canadian FPA model did not include mandatory union dues it would
represent a substantial departure from the Canadian labour relations regime. However,
we do not believe that mandatory dues for all employees covered by FPAs is a realistic
or viable option, given that it is quite likely that a substantial majority of the workers
covered by FPAs will not be members of any union, and may not have even been
approached to become members of any union. Therefore, we propose to follow the
example of the New Zealand Bill in which there would be no automatic dues check-off
provision in FPAs.
Nonetheless, we consider it necessary for unions to have access to a source of financial
support. Instead of mandatory dues payable by all employees under an FPA, we propose
that the statute provide that member fees are payable by those employees who choose
to join the union by signing a membership card. An employee could join the union either
at the time of application for sectoral bargaining or thereafter. Once an FPA is reached,
membership dues would be covered by a negotiated wage increase in the FPA in the
form of a “union member payment.” We further propose that the “union member
payments” from employers would be included in the FPA if requested by the employee
side bargaining group, similarly to the common Canadian collective bargaining legislation
provision for a dues check-off provision. The amount of the payment would equivalent to
the dues of the particular union that the employee decided to join.
In return for union membership, employees would receive the right to representation by
the union in respect to any violations of the FPA, and all other rights and obligations that
come with union membership. These additional union services would be available only to
employees covered by an FPA who are also union members. We do not think that an
employee who is covered by an FPA should be required to be part of a traditionally
certified union bargaining unit with a collective agreement in order to be a member of a
union. Employees covered by an FPA should be able to join the union of their choice as
individuals.
10. Duty of Fair Representation
The New Zealand Bill does not include a duty of fair representation provision. Our
proposal includes substantial and detailed requirements for engagement and information
provision during bargaining, robust good faith obligations, ratification, and employees can
individually seek enforcement of the sector agreement. Therefore, while it is a departure
from the Canadian labour relations norm, we do not regard a separate duty of fair
representation to be a necessary part of our proposal, either.
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11. Freedoms and Unfair Labour Practice Protections
The New Zealand Bill outlines an array of prohibited conduct to protect employees,
employers, unions, and employer associations, using the term “undue influence.” 72 We
also regard unfair labour practice (“ULP”) protections to be necessary to ensure freedom
of association, the opportunity to organize, and bargaining under this proposed system.
We propose that the type of ULP protections commonly found in Canadian collective
bargaining legislation be included in this statute. In particular:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Prohibit employers, employer associations, or persons acting on their behalf from
participating in or interfering with the formation, administration, or representation
rights of a union, or from contributing to a trade union.
Prohibit employees, unions, or persons acting on their behalf from participating in
or interfering with the formation or administration of an employers’ organization.
Employers, employer associations, or persons acting on their behalf may not
discriminate against or refuse to employ employees because they were or are
members of a union.
Employers or employer associations are prohibited from altering employment
conditions to prevent employees or potential employees from becoming a member
of a union.
Employers or employer associations are prohibited from threatening or penalizing
employees for becoming or refraining from becoming members of a union.
Unions, employers, or any other person are prohibited from engaging in coercion,
intimidation, or undue influence designed to compel or prevent membership in
union or employer associations.

Unilateral employer changes to terms or conditions of work during certification or for a
period during bargaining when no agreement is in operation and without labour board
permission are commonly prohibited ULPs. These prohibitions are referred to as statutory
“freezes” under Canadian collective bargaining law. Departing from the New Zealand Bill
in this respect, we propose that a freeze apply during the organizing period up to the point
where the FPA application is approved, and bargaining can begin. We regard this as an
important protection for employees’ free choice about collective representation. However,
in light of the availability of interest arbitration for bargaining dispute resolution in this
model, we do not propose including a statutory bargaining freeze during bargaining.
The labour board should have jurisdiction over ULP complaints and, as with other
violations of the statute, we propose that the labour board have similar authority as it
exercises under collective bargaining legislation to decide and remedy these ULPs.
In addition to these ULP prohibitions, we propose including general statements of
employee and employer freedoms, which also commonly appear in Canadian bargaining
legislation: the freedom of all employees to join the trade union of their own choice and
to participate in its lawful activities, and similar freedom for employers with respect to
employers’ associations. 73
72
73

Ibid, s 16.
See, for example, Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sched A, ss 5-6.
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More generally, the labour board would be responsible for receiving and adjudicating
complaints of violation of the legislation itself, which could be brought by employer
representatives or unions, but not by individual employees.
12. Enforcement and Remedies
The New Zealand Bill provides a system of modest financial penalties for non-compliance,
which in most cases is to be administered by the Authority, although in some
circumstances, courts have jurisdiction. Unless otherwise ordered, penalties are paid into
a Crown Bank account and not to any particular person. 74 The Bill does not appear to
provide for remedies other than financial penalties.
Actions for recovery of penalties for breach of an FPA under the New Zealand Bill may
be brought by any party to the FPA that has been affected by the breach, while any other
breach of the legislation may be brought by a person in relation to whom the breach is
alleged to have occurred. 75
We regard it as important that agreements be statutorily enforced. We do not regard
negotiated enforcement to be desirable. In this respect, our proposal accords with the
New Zealand Bill. We also regard it as important that employees covered by a sector
agreement be able to seek enforcement of the sector agreement on an individual basis if
they choose to do so, and that union and employer parties to the agreement are not the
only possible complainants.
Therefore, for the Canadian model we propose that complaints of violation of sector
agreements may be brought either by employees or by the union on behalf of employees.
In addition, unions could file group or policy complaints. Employers may also bring
complaints of non-compliance by unions or by other employers in order to discourage
employers from seeking to undercut or avoid sector agreements.
It is with respect to jurisdiction and the types of penalties and remedies available for
violation of sector agreements and the legislation that we depart from the New Zealand
Bill and, to some extent, from the tradition of collective agreement arbitration in our
proposal for a Canadian FPA model. While we recognize that the Canadian collective
bargaining system traditionally utilizes labour arbitration to adjudicate complaints of
collective agreement violations, we do not regard it to be feasible for individual employee
complaints to be received or administered by an arbitrator. Therefore, similar to the
existing approach to complaints under the Ontario Employment Standards Act, we
propose that complaints of violations of sector agreements are to be filed with the Ministry
of Labour or equivalent body, and decisions would be made by an administrative officer,
which could then be appealed to the labour board. 76
While statutory financial penalty provisions applicable to violation of the legislation, but
not collective agreement violation, are commonly found in Canadian collective bargaining

Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, ss 196-203.
Ibid, s 201.
76
Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41, Part XXII.
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legislation, complainants rarely seek these penalties. 77 Financial penalties, in the form of
punitive damages, are uncommon in arbitration awards for collective agreement violations
and no statutory financial penalties exist for such violations. Instead, the Canadian
collective bargaining system focuses on compensatory remedies and proactive
enforcement mechanisms, such as those administered by the Ministry of Labour and the
Employment Standards Branch.
We prefer to adopt a similar focus on compensatory remedies and proactive enforcement
for statutory and sector agreement violations, as we regard these as more constructive
and practical approaches in the Canadian context. Therefore, an array of remedies would
be available for sector agreement violations and for violations of the legislation. In addition
to remedies commonly available for breach of collective agreements or legislation under
existing collective bargaining legislation, remedies would include financial penalties for
repeated or serious violations, costs awarded to the complainant or union, unannounced
inspections of employers, and publication of identities of serious violators. The purpose
of these latter remedies is to deter “bad actors” from undermining sector agreements.
13. Relationship to Existing Collective Agreements
The New Zealand Bill explicitly states that the existence of a union certification or a
collective agreement is not a bar to the initiation and negotiation of an FPA. Further, and
more importantly, the existence of an FPA is not a “genuine reason” to hinder the
certification of a union or the negotiation and conclusion of a collective agreement. 78
The New Zealand Bill also provides that, where employees are covered by both an FPA
and a collective agreement, whenever there are overlapping provisions, the employee
gets the benefit of the “more favourable” provision. 79
In other words, under the New Zealand Bill, an FPA operates as a floor from which a
union may negotiate better provisions in a collective agreement for their members. This
is similar to the way in which minimum standards legislation operates in Canada.
Therefore, the FPA system is designed to coexist with and complement the existing
collective bargaining system.
We propose a similar approach in Canada. FPA legislation will not replace unions and
unions will continue to be free to organize under existing collective bargaining legislation.
As noted above, there is evidence that an “integration” approach – rather than one system
displacing another system – has more positive outcomes for workers and employers as
a whole. In addition, this approach is currently employed in Canada, where labour
relations and employment standards laws are already integrated. Similarly, it must be
clear that the FPA should not interfere in regular collective bargaining, and the FPA should
be considered a sectoral standard from which unions can only bargain better terms and
77 Ontario, “CWR Final Report,” supra note 4 at 123-134, 388-394; Ontario, Ontario Ministry of Labour,
The Changing Workplaces Review: An Agenda for Workplace Rights, by C. Michael Mitchell & John C.
Murray, Interim Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 27 July 2016) at 15, 27, 34-35, 51.
78 Fair Pay Agreements Bill (NZ), supra note 6, s 163.
79 Ibid.
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conditions in collective agreements and cannot derogate from existing employment
standards.
14. Political and Transitional Considerations
One of the widely recognized issues associated with a transition to a new workplace
regulatory framework is establishing support for that system from the stakeholders
affected by it: most directly, the “buy in” from employers, unions, and workers who will be
subject to the system.
This makes common sense: stakeholders who are used to and invested in an existing
system of workplace regulation, however imperfect or increasingly inadequate, may be
resistant to the changes and adaptation that will be required to implement a new system.
We have mentioned some of these issues in the preceding discussion, and have
suggested some solutions: for example, adequate state support for both unions and
employer councils to prepare for and engage in sectoral standard setting exercises.
Indeed, one of the lessons from a review of the history of sectoral workplace regulation
in Canada is that it is most often adopted when both employers and workers see the new
system as a solution to limits of the existing one.
Thus far, the evidence in New Zealand suggests that this model may generate less
resistance from employers than might be expected. Under an FPA, wages and other core
labour standards are taken out of competition across an entire sector or industry.
However, the fact that sectoral bargaining levels the playing field in respect of labour
standards does not mean that employers will not resist – especially if they are not given
adequate supports for bargaining the sectoral standard.
Similarly, experience in the U.S. and Canada shows that, where sectoral reforms are
proposed, existing union stakeholders may view the new system with scepticism or
opposition, particularly where there is already sufficient access to collective bargaining.
For the same reason, the principle of integration is intended to facilitate the
implementation of the new FPA model and stakeholder participation in it. Initial reports on
experience from New Zealand indicate that existing trade unions have supported the
introduction of the system and view it as an opportunity to organize economic sectors that
have very low union density.
Conclusion
The proposal outlined here is for a democratically accountable, participatory, and
inclusive framework for sectoral standard-setting and bargaining. As such, it is a
departure from the traditional Canadian model of exclusivity and majoritarianism. This
proposal reflects neither of those two principles.
While this proposal is a departure, there is ample evidence that the traditional Canadian
model is ill-suited to addressing the many new challenges posed by contemporary work,
and there is significant evidence and support for a sectoral approach to workplace
representation. So far, efforts to modify our existing labour relations model to insert a
sectoral component have not gained traction, in part because past proposals have been
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too complicated, and unlikely to actually achieve broad based sectoral bargaining that
would cover the economy with sufficient breadth to take wages and key employment
conditions out of competition.
We suggest that the proposal outlined here addresses these key weaknesses: it is not
overly complicated, it remains rooted in key established labour relations practices, and it
is designed to be integrated with existing workplace regulation and representation, while
also providing flexibility for employers, employees, and their representatives.
Since the Second World War, labour law reform in Canada has largely been incremental.
Over the last several decades, jurisdictions have wavered between improving worker
access to collective bargaining and then retrenching back to limit access to unionization.
In the meantime, union density in the Canadian private sector has been falling for the last
40 years – both in jurisdictions with more favourable labour laws and in those without. As
a result of this declining union density, there has been increasing energy and activism
towards improving minimum standards legislation as a vehicle to improve the working
conditions for all workers – especially those that have virtually no access to collective
bargaining in our current system.
Declining union density in the private sector was one of the key rationales for the New
Zealand Bill upon which our proposal is modelled. The fact that our proposal is closely
modelled on a piece of legislation presently before the legislature in New Zealand
provides a useful policy laboratory for a Canadian FPA model. It is also worth noting that
the New Zealand model has attracted substantial attention in countries such as Great
Britain and Australia.
To some, the prospect of introducing a sectoral FPA system in Canada may seem
unrealistic. However, it is worth noting that the New Zealand approach started out as a
paragraph in the New Zealand Labour Party’s electoral platform. 80 Once elected, the
Labour Party struck a commission, chaired by an employer representative, which
ultimately proposed the FPA model. A detailed policy proposal followed, and now the
legislation is on the precipice of becoming law.
Canada, like New Zealand, is confronted with a real crisis in private sector labour market
regulation. Increasingly, workers simply do not have access to any collective
representation, and they have no ability to bargain decent working conditions. Canadian
policy makers need good policy ideas to address this problem, and, like their New Zealand
counterparts, they need the courage to implement those ideas. We hope that this paper
can contribute to the development of Canadian policy in this important area.

NZ, the Labour Party, “Workplace Relations & Safety”, online:
<https://www.labour.org.nz/workplacerelations>.
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